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Security Information

TO: Chiefs, Field Bureaus
FROM Acting Chief, FBIS
SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

17 August 1953

GENERAL

1. Work on the Santa Rosa, California, station was resumed on 14 July after a general construction strike in the San Francisco Bay area. Footings and foundations for the operations building are now nearly completed.

2. The first eight permanent FBIS houses in Okinawa have been completed except for external utility connections. The second eight houses are nearing completion. Utility connections for all sixteen houses are in progress.

3. Mediterranean Bureau now has twenty-one houses under lease or pre-lease agreements. These plus bachelor apartments under pre-lease agreement will provide housing for the majority of the bureau staff requiring FBIS housing.

4. T/O changes include deletion of two Intelligence Officer positions at the London Bureau, deletion of two guard positions at the Mediterranean Bureau, and addition of one chauffeur and one typist position at the Saigon Bureau. The London Bureau deletions followed discontinuance of Counter Psychological Warfare Reports formerly prepared at that Bureau.

5. The following are security remarks excerpted from an official Agency bulletin and considered appropriate for field dissemination:

"a. USE OF PERSONAL CAMERAS WHILE VACATIONING ABROAD

Employees vacationing abroad should be particularly careful in the use of personal cameras. Experience has shown that the photographing of objects or places which are construed by a foreign government to be of intelligence interest may lead to awkward personal experiences and consequent embarrassment to the Agency and the U. S. Government.

"b. PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES OF CIA

Headquarters personnel should not make reference to Agency intelligence matters or Agency personnel in corresponding with Agency

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employees who are overseas. The use of double-talk or personal cryptographic systems in such correspondence should also be scrupulously avoided. It should be remembered that the international mails are subject to censorship and that, therefore, the possibility of compromise always exists in this type of correspondence.

"c. PERSONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE 'NEED-TO-KNOW' SECURITY PRINCIPLE

No employee is entitled to knowledge or possession of classified information by virtue of his or her rank, title, office, or position; or by reason of the fact that it is known he has been cleared by Security. In addition to security clearance, the 'need-to-know' is the basic principle for permitting access to classified information. Do not grant access or attempt to gain access to classified information. Do not grant access or attempt to gain access to classified matter which is not required in the course of your official duties. Personal enforcement of the 'need-to-know' principle is mandatory in the maintenance of security and the prevention of leaks. Adhere to the 'need-to-know' rule at all times.

"d. TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

It is apparent from the number of traffic warrants which local police are attempting to serve on personnel of this Agency that some Agency employees are not complying with the provisions of Security Notice No. S-3-52 released on 15 October 1952. You are reminded that employees of the Agency who receive tickets for traffic or parking violations must settle such matters promptly with the appropriate police department. Employees preparing to depart for overseas should understand that warrants against them are not suspended during their duty tours outside the country and can result in unnecessary disclosures of Agency employment."

6. Field personnel who have loans with the Credit Union are reminded of their personal responsibility to forward remittances on time to meet scheduled payment dates.

7. Upon receipt and approval of subscription orders, reference periodicals are sent directly to the field. It is requested that field bureaus advise the Liaison Officer when service begins in such cases. Field Bureaus should keep close checks on expiration dates of periodical subscriptions and forward renewal requests to the Liaison Officer in sufficient time to avoid interruptions or cancellations of service. If a periodical is no longer needed, please notify the Liaison Officer so subscription can be cancelled.

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OPERATIONS

1. A survey of consumer reaction to FBID publications was recently completed. Consumer evaluations of the various publications were as follows:

A. Restricted USSR and Eastern Europe Daily Report

Distribution: 555 copies to 151 authorized recipients.

	Of considerable value	Of value	Of slight value	Of no value	Questionnaires received.	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	26	43	8		77	36
Dept. of Army-----	9	13	3		25	22
Dept. of Navy-----		3	1	1	5	2
Dept. of Air-----	3	1			5	4
Dept. of State-----	43	27	3		73	72
Other Authorized Agencies--	7	4	1		12	15
Total	88	91	16	1	196	151

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B. Restricted Far East Daily Report

Distribution: 443 copies to 113 authorized recipients.

	Of considerable value	Of value	Of slight value	Of no value	Questionnaires received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	34	26	4		64	36
Dept. of Army-----	5	15	1		21	19
Dept. of Navy-----	2	2			4	1
Dept. of Air-----	2				2	5
Dept. of State-----	28	27	3		58	39
Other Authorized Agencies-	4	3	1	1	9	17
Total	75	73	9	1	158	113

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C. Restricted Western Europe and Near East Daily Report

Distribution: 429 copies to 104 authorized recipients.

	Of considerable value.	Of value	Of slight value	Of no value	Questionnaires Received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	27	31	8		66	30
Dept. of Army-----	4	9	4		17	15
Dept. of Navy-----		3	3		6	1
Dept. of Air-----			1		1	5
Dept. of State-----	49	39		1	89	38
Other Authorized Agencies-----	3	7			10	15
Total	83	89	16	1	189	104

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D. Restricted Latin American Daily Report

Distribution: 256 copies to 79 authorized recipients.

	Of considerable value	Of value	Of slight value	Of no value	Questionnaires Received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	9	14	5		28	24
Dept. of Army-----		11	2		13	14
Dept. of Navy-----	1	1	1	1	4	1
Dept. of Air-----		2	1		3	2
Dept. of State-----	21	16	5	1	43	21
Other Authorized Agencies-	2	7			9	17
Total	33	51	14	2	100	79

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E. Restricted Political Abstracts

Distribution: 153 copies to 27 authorized recipients.

	Of considerable value	Of value	Of slight value	Of no value	Questionnaires Received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	4	3	3		10	17
Dept. of Army-----	2	2	1		5	2
Dept. of Navy-----	11	1			2	1
Dept. of Air-----						2
Dept. of State-----	5	15	3	1	24	2
Other Authorized Agencies-						3
Total	12	21	7	1	41	27

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F. Confidential Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts

Distribution: 361 copies to 75 authorized recipients.

	Of great value	Of subsidiary value	Of no value	Questionnaires Received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	13	23	6	42	29
Dept. of Army-----	2	11	2	15	14
Dept. of Navy-----	1	11	2	15	14
Dept. of Air-----	5	8	3	16	15
Dept. of State-----	8	28	1	37	15
Other Authorized Agencies-----	1	6		7	4
Total	30	79	14	123	75

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G. Confidential Trends and Highlights of Peking Broadcasts

Distribution: 404 copies to 83 authorized recipients.

	Of great value	Of subsidiary value.	Of no value	Questionnaires Received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	8	22	5	35	28
Dept. of Armu-----		7	2	9	13
Dept. of Navy-----	1	3		4	1
Dept. of Air-----	3	5		8	13
Dept. of State-----	7	20	5	32	18
Other Authorized Agencies-	1	9	4	14	10
Total	20	66	16	102	83

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H. Confidential Survey of USSR Broadcasts

Distribution: 340 copies to 70 authorized recipients.

	Of great value	Of subsidiary value	Of no value	Questionnaires received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	18	31	4	53	27
Dept. of Army-----	2	11		13	11
Dept. of Navy-----	2	13		5	1
Dept. of Air-----	2	5	1	8	11
Dept. of State-----	9	20		29	15
Other Authorized Agencies-	4	1		5	5
	37	71	5	113	70

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I. Confidential Survey of Far East Broadcasts

Distribution: 349 copies to 86 authorized recipients.

	Of great value	Of subsidiary value	Of no value	Questionnaires Received	Recipient Offices
CIA-----	8	11		19	31
Dept. of Army-----		9	1	10	15
Dept. of Navy-----		3		3	1
Dept. of Air-----	2	1		3	8
Dept. of State-----	5	12	2	19	21
Other Authorized Agencies-		7	2	9	10
Total	15	43	5	63	86

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J. Unclassified Daily Report

	Of considerable value	Of value	Of slight value	Of no value	No. of question- naires sent	No. received
Press and Radio-----	36	12			65	48
Public and University Libraries-	14	12		1	32	27
Members of Congress-----	3	3		2	11	8
Total	53	27		3	115	83

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2. Technical tests at Niigata by the Chief, Tokyo Bureau, and Engineer, North Japan Bureau, for the purpose of estimating probable level of electrical interference from the nearby oil refinery revealed that while the level is presently satisfactory, development of the proposed antenna area as an oil field has recently begun, thereby creating a potentially prohibitive situation. A recapitulation of the Niigata area indicates only one possible alternative site, which is being further investigated.

3. Arrangements have been concluded with BBC, since it has standardized its recording equipment to conform with FBID, for the permanent retention of dictabelts containing monitored broadcasts of special significance to the U. S. Government as defined by the regulation guiding all FBID field stations in archive selections.

4. Representatives of the Office of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, received at Psywar's request just prior to the truce signing, a special briefing by FBID on the North Korean and Chinese Communist broadcasting systems and three specially prepared papers dealing with background information on this subject.

5. Special technical reports were prepared by the Broadcast Information Section at the request of O/RR as follows:

- (a) "The Albanian Broadcasting System"
- (b) "The Polish Broadcasting System"

EDITORIAL COMMENT

All Bureaus

1. FYI's and parenthetical remarks further identifying individuals mentioned in copy are welcomes and have been of great help. However, some caution should be used in categorically identifying any individual so mentioned if the Field Editor is not absolutely sure who he is; in such cases a qualifying "possibly," or "apparently" would suffice. Thus, in a reference to a commentary by one Mikhailov on the CRSU Theses, the editor identified him as the "Secretary of the Moscow Party Central Committee." It so happens that one Mikhailov is actually the First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, but the Mikhailov who gave the commentary was an entirely different person. A check with the field station concerned showed that the broadcast had not identified Mikhailov, and the conclusion of the editor in this instance was both gratuitous and erroneous. In summation, FYI's which will clear up obscure points such as the identity of individuals mentioned casually in the copy, are wanted, but information which is not positive should be indicated by some qualifying phrase.

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London Bureau

1. Expeditious handling by all concerned enabled FLID to have a complete, edited and corrected textual version of the Zverev 1953 budget report to the USSR Supreme Council in the hands of interested intelligence officers by 0352 EDT, 6 August. The importance of this is indicated by the fact that Agency analysts were at their desks all during the night working on this budget statement.

West Coast Bureau

1. The briefing of marginal NCNA English Morse items is greatly appreciated by Washington editors.

Okinawa Bureau

1. It is requested that editors, in the processing of Chinese Numeral Code, guard against inconsistencies in the names of groups, organizations, committees, etc. Sometimes inconsistency shows up in the same item when handled in takes by more than one editor. More often it is apparent in follow-up items in which monitor and editor concerned have not checked terminology previously employed. It would be advisable for the Bureau to keep current a standard list of designations to avoid inconsistency and ambiguity.

2. Okinawa's FYI's on discrepancies between NCNA English Morse and Peking International Service versions of Korean truce items have been extremely welcome.

Tokyo Bureau

1. Uniformity in the naming of such organizations as National Safety Corps, Japan-Communist China Friendship Association (or whatever is preferred), Peace Liaison Council, Repatriation Relief Board, political parties, etc., would be appreciated. This does not mean that generic, descriptive, or informal terms are to be avoided, but that consistency in the use of proper names is desired. For example, Sakhalin is sometimes rendered as "Saghalein," the Strike Control Bill is often referred to as the "Anti-Strike Bill," and the Socialist parties are variously referred to formally as "Right-wing" or "Rightist," and "Left-wing" or "Leftist." Awkward Japanese inversions such as "Japan-U.S. joint action" and "Foreign Vice Minister" should be avoided.

SPECIAL REPORTS

1. In compiling the Soviet commentary lists, care should be taken to distinguish between PRAVDA articles and PRAVDA editorials. On several

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recent occasions various bureaus have called an item a PRAVDA article which others called a PRAVDA editorial. This requires extra checking to determine which listing is correct.

2. All Bureaus are reminded that new editors should be briefed on compiling the Soviet commentary lists in accordance with Operational Memorandum 551-3 (Instructions for Compiling Soviet Commentary List). There has been a tendency lately to depart from the procedures set forth therein.

3. Approval was obtained for the issuance of propaganda analyses devoted to particular events, intelligence problems, or research topics in a new publication entitled "Radio Propaganda Report," replacing supplements to the Surveys of USSR and Far East Broadcasts. First issues in the new format will appear in August.

4. Survey supplements during the month reviewed indications of Soviet policy in PRAVDA comment on East-West relations, examined propaganda on the President's offer of food for East Germany and surveyed Chinese Communist propaganda with relation to the economic objectives of the regime. Immediate indications of Soviet policy after the fall of Beria were supplied by typescript on OCI request. Soviet propaganda strategy in respect to Britain was summarized in support of NIE 97.

5. A written expression of appreciation for recent papers in support of psychological operations was received from the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board.

PERSONNEL CHANGES

1. Effective 24 July 1953, Mr. Alan M. Warfield was assigned as Acting Chief, Planning and Coordinating Staff, Office of the Assistant Director for Operations. He will serve in this capacity through 16 October 1953 when he will again assume his duties as Chief of the Foreign Broadcast Information Division.

2. New Employees:

Radio Operator
Chauffeur
Multi-Monitor
Telegraph Typewriter Operator
Telegraph Typewriter Operator
Monitoring Technician
Monitoring Technician


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Editorial Branch
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
3. Separations:

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
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3. Separations: (continued)

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4. Reassignments:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Info Spec (Fgn Brdcst) Editorial Branch	Info Spec(Fgn Brdcst) 50X1 East Coast Bureau
Teleg Typwr Opr Editorial Branch	File Clerk Administrative Staff
Mail & File Clerk Administrative Staff	Clerk-Steno Engineer Staff
Info Spec (Fgn Brdcst) Editorial Branch	Info Spec(Fgn Brdcst) London Bureau
Info Spec (Fgn Brdcst) Editorial Branch	Info Spec(Fgn Brdcst) West Coast Bureau
Info Spec (Fgn Brdcst) London Bureau	Info Spec(Fgn Brdcst) East Coast Bureau
Radio Operator West Coast Bureau	Information Spec Brdcst Info Section
Radio Operator West Coast Bureau	Elect Engineer Okinawa Bureau
Elect Engineer WCB - Reseda	Elect Engineer WCB - Santa Rosa
Elect Engineer West Coast Bureau	Elect Engineer Okinawa Bureau
Elect Engineer West Coast Bureau	Elect Engineer Okinawa Bureau
Info Spec (Fgn Brdcst) Editorial Branch	Info Spec(Fgn Brdcst) German Bureau



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